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Reading AdAb as Fiqh: al-ǃaḥiẓ’s singing-girls and the limits of legal 
reasoning (Qiyās)1
ignacio sánchez
University of Cambridge
introduction
in the Ḍast years, have appeared, iḍportant contributions to the study of aḌ-ǃaḥiẓ 
aimed at reading his works in a new light and revising the stereotyped image of the author 
as a mercurial adīb eager to pander to his ḍany patrons. this siḍpḌistic characterization 
of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s ǦḌiterary geniusǧ together with a ḍisḌeading biographicaḌ eḍphasis on the 
anaḌysis of his works, brought about the schoḌarḌy phenoḍenon that Jaḍes montgoḍery 
has denominated Buḫalaism, an approach that dissoḌves the apparent oddities of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s 
works into the familiar conventions of his alleged humoristic treatises, such as the Kitāb 
al-Buḫalāɻ. as a resuḌt of these ḍisconceptions, aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s reputation as a reḌiabḌe witness 
and active agent of the reḌigious-poḌiticaḌ poḌeḍics of the earḌy ɼabbāsid period has carried 
the stigma of his inconstancy and many of his treatises have not received the attention 
they deserved2.  this paper, inspired by the saḍe revisionist spirit, aiḍs to contribute to 
this new reading of the ǃāḥiẓian Ḍegacy by focusing on the coḍpḌexities of one of his ḍost 
famous works, the Epistle on the singing Girls (Risāla fī al-qiyān). Concretely i shall be looking 
at one of the aspects of this work that i consider has been especially overlooked by scholars: 
aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s use of ḌegaḌ arguḍents.
 in this regard, this paper is an experiḍent in reading the treatises of iqh and adab-
works together and an atteḍpt to deḍonstrate aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s acquaintance with ḌegaḌ 
herḍeneutics. aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s Risāla fī al-Qiyān has been traditionaḌḌy read as a relection on 
Ḍove and passion, especiaḌḌy after cheikh-moussa’s inluentiaḌ articḌe Ǧla négation d’Érosǧ 
of which i will make wide use3. i will argue that, in addition to this discourse based on 
the dichotomy ͥubb/ɼiŀq, there is a second argumentative line which addresses a scholarly 
polemic concerning the limits of legal prohibition and the interpretation of the revealed 
sources, and that this ḌegaḌ context is necessary for a proper understanding of the Risāla fī 
al-qiyān. 
1. i wish to thank Jaḍes montgoḍery and the anonyḍous reviewer for their vaḌuabḌe and insightfuḌ coḍḍents 
on this article.
2. MontgoMery 2007. 
3. see Sicard 1987, cheikh-MouSSa 1990 and gordon 2009.
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the iḍage of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ as a schoḌar versed in the principḌes of Ḍaw certainḌy does not 
answer to the depiction of the author that we ind in the sources — Ḍet aḌone in secondary 
Ḍiterature —, and requires further expḌanation. in fact, the ḌittḌe we know about aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s 
reḌation with the musḌiḍ jurists of his tiḍe and his acquaintance with the principḌes of Ḍaw 
shows a very negative image. already in the third/ninth century, it was precisely one of 
aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s students, ibn Qutayba, who put the irst naiḌ in the coin where the credibiḌity 
of his forḍer teacher wouḌd be buried. ibn Qutayba accused aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ of being inconstant, 
capable of defending contradictory opinions, of using false ͥadīṯs and, even worse, of 
forging them4. this opinion, together with aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s muɼtaziḌite credentiaḌs, his personaḌ 
involvement in the Miͥna, and the vitriolic treatises he wrote against the members of the 
traditionist milieu to whom he contemptuously referred to as ͤaŀwiyya and Nābita, gained 
hiḍ the faḍe he has enjoyed ever since, that of being a reined adīb who despised the 
religious scholars, a valuable yet anarchic theologian, and lagellum hereticorum in his own 
way, which was deterḍined by his defence of the muɼtaziḌite cause5.
We wouḌd not ind ḍany traces of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s interest in iqh if we paid attention to 
the inventory of his works. out of the aḌḍost 300 titḌes coḌḌected by charḌes PeḌḌat, onḌy 
one refers directly to a legal topic, the Kitāb fī ḫabar al-wāͥid ḍentioned by aḌ-BāqiḌḌānī6. 
this work, if it ever existed, has not survived. the reference is aḌso a singḌe report in itself; 
we do not have any other reference to this treatise, but aḌ-BāqiḌḌānī knew what he was 
taḌking about: this work is ḍentioned, together with aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s Naϓm al-Qurɻān and al-Radd 
ɼalā al-NaΣārā, as one of the works where the author discussed the concept of ḫabar.
the treatḍent of aḫbār is aḌso the ḍain topic of another treatise of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ, the Kitāb 
al-aḫbār wa-kayfa taΣiͥͥu, where aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ reports the opinions of aḌ-naẓẓāḍ concerning 
ͥadīṯ7. the inforḍation provided by this text does not ofer any particuḌar insight into aḌ-
ǃāḥiẓ’s attitude towards the reḌigious schoḌars and ḌegaḌ theory, but there are other works 
that, despite not being excḌusiveḌy devoted to ḌegaḌ topics, show cḌearḌy that aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ was 
not only familiar with the legal polemics of his time, but also with the hermeneutical 
principles invoked in these debates.
of course, aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s interests were not reduced to the aḫbār. Jaḍes montgoḍery was 
the irst to draw attention to the cḌear paraḌḌeḌisḍs between aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s deinition of bayān 
and that ḍade by aḌ-Ŀāiɼī in his Risāla8. for montgoḍery, this discussion ḍay have been 
part of a poḌeḍicaḌ engageḍent with aḌ-Ŀāiɼī’s treatḍent of this subject, an engageḍent 
that has been aḌso recognised by Joseph lowry in his study of aḌ-Ŀāiɼī’s Risāla9.
the reḌation between aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ and aḌ-Ŀāiɼī goes beyond the particuḌar poḌeḍic 
concerning the deinition of bayān. although i am aware of but a single direct reference 
to aḌ-Ŀāiɼī in the works of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ10, aḌ-Ŀāiɼī is a constant presence in his treatises and aḌ-
4. ibn Qutayba, Muḫtalif al-ͥadīṯ, p. 59-60.
5. on aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s Ḍife and career see Pellat 1953.
6. Pellat 1984, sub n. 75. bāqillānī, iɼjāz al-Qurɼān, p. 377.
7. edited in Van eSS 1976.
8. MontgoMery 2005.
9. lowry 2007, p. 51-55.
10. aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ refers to aḌ-Ŀāiɼī as the author of the Risāla fī iṯbāt ḫabar al-wāͥid, see al-ǦāḤiẒ, Risāla fī faḍl Hāŀim ɼalá 
ɼAbd al-Ŀamŀ, p. 106.
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ǃāḥiẓ’s anaḌysis of the reḌigious sources, especiaḌḌy in his works on the iḍaḍate, is based 
on Ŀāiɼite herḍeneutics11. the Risāla fī al-qiyān provides a good exaḍpḌe of this reḌation 
and, in generaḌ, of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s knowḌedge of the ḌegaḌ poḌeḍics of his tiḍe. as i wiḌḌ argue, 
this epistle not only addreses real legal debates but also, legal polemics governing the 
underḌying Ḍogic of this treatise and structure the entire text. 
DRAMAtis pERsoNAE and structure of the ePistle
like the rest of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s treatises, the Risāla fī al-qiyān is a poḌyphonic text of 
extraordinary coḍpḌexity where severaḌ diaḌogic structures ḌeveḌs interact at varied ḌeveḌs. 
there are four interḌocutors; three of theḍ correspond to the diferent voices that speak 
in the epistḌe, as cheikh-moussa has shown, and the fourth are the addresses of the epistḌe, 
who do not speak but whose arguḍents are exposed and refuted:12
1) the ɼabbāsid notabḌes who defend their right to enjoy the pḌeasures provided by 
singing-girls and whose names are given in the opening paragraph. as Cheikh-
moussa has deḍonstrated, they were notabḌe ḍeḍbers of the ɼabbāsid court and 
their voice corresponds to the irst person pḌuraḌ in §1-32.13
2) those who criticised the practice of frequenting the coḍpany of singing girḌs, who 
are referred to as ḥaŀwiyya, a pejorative terḍ usuaḌḌy used by aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ to refer to 
the ḍost ignorant ḍeḍbers of the traditionist ḍiḌieu. they are the addresses of 
the epistle.
3) aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ, whose voice wouḌd correspond to the irst person singuḌar in §33-35, and, 
occasionally, also in other parts of the epistle.
4) the ḍerchants of singing girḌs (muqayyinūn), who defend both the lawfulness of 
trading with sḌave-girḌs and the diḌatory ruses they eḍpḌoy to excite the passion of 
their cḌients, increase the frequency of their visits and obtain ḍore beneits; their 
voice wouḌd correspond to the irst person pḌuraḌ in §38-54.
Both PeḌḌat and Beeston, whose reading of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s epistḌes is often conditioned by 
the digressive style of this author, have considered the Risāla fī al-qiyān a highly disorganised 
work; after aḌḌ, anecdotes were aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s bread and butter and his innate curiosity 
prevented him from following a systematic method14. of course, this is but one ḍore of the 
ǦBuͫaḌaistǧ stereotypes about this author that shouḌd be rejected. Beyond the weḌter of 
confusing voices there are two clear argumentative lines that structure the epistle:
1) discourse on law: the discussion between the purported authors of the epistle 
and their critics, the ḥaŀwiyya, is centred on the discussion of the Ḍiḍits of the 
prohibitions contained in the revealed sources and the dichotomy ͥarām/ͥalāl. 
11. aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ ḍakes a consistent use of Ŀāiɼite herḍeneutics especiaḌḌy in the Kitāb al-ɼuṯmāniyya. i have analysed 
aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s treatḍent of the Qurɻān in this treatise, see sÁnchez (forthcoming).
12. cheikh-MouSSa 1990, p. 101.
13. cheikh-MouSSa 1990, p. 89-95.
14. a good exaḍpḌe of this consideration is PeḌḌat’s taxonoḍy in his coḌḌection of transḌations froḍ aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s 
treatises, see Pellat 1984.
206 ignacio sánchez
the defence of the ḌawfuḌness of their trade ḍade by the muqayyinūn addresses 
siḍiḌar critiques and is centred on the ḌegaḌ distinction between intention (niyya) 
and act (ɼamal), and evidence (ϓāhir) and suspicion (ŀubha).
2) discourse on Ḍove and passion: this discourse has been read as an exposition of 
aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s ethicaḌ ideas to condeḍn the practice defended by the authors of the 
epistle.
cheikh-moussa has cogentḌy argued that aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s treatḍent of the qiyān is predicated 
upon a soḌid theory of huḍan passions and has deḍonstrated how aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s treatḍent of 
the dichotomy ͥubb/ɼiŀq articuḌates part of the arguḍents deveḌoped in this epistḌe. for 
cheikh-moussa, the purpose of this work is to eḌevate the discourse on huḍan passions 
to the ethicaḌ ḌeveḌ, overcoḍing the sophistry of the ḌegaḌ disquisitions that eḍerges here 
and there throughout the treatise. for hiḍ, the ḌegaḌ principḌes adduced in this text are 
indisputabḌe for the musḌiḍs and, despite the eforts of the defenders of the reḌations with 
the qiyān to disguise their arguḍents behind decontextuaḌised Qurɻānic quotations, the 
ŀarī ɼa clearly states that these practices are unlawful15. the references to ḌegaḌ arguḍents 
shouḌd be interpreted, therefore, as satiricaḌ aḌḌusions that provoke the opposite efect 
to the one intended. the ḍain purpose of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ in this risāla is to deine the ethicaḌ 
boundaries that the members of the ḫāΣΣa shouḌd respect; consequentḌy, the Ḍogic that 
underlines his treatment of the polemics concerning the qiyān should be found in al-
ǃāḥiẓ’s ethicaḌ theories.
it is beyond doubt that the discourse on huḍan passions constitutes one of the axis of 
this epistḌe. i do not consider, however, that ḌegaḌ considerations pḌay any Ḍess a part. on 
the contrary, aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s epistḌe is aḌso structured upon cḌear juridicaḌ arguḍentations and 
the ḌegaḌ issues proḍpted in this text were by no ḍeans undisputed, indeed, they refer to 
iḍportant poḌeḍics addressed by aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ in other works.
the discourse on laW in the RisālA fī Al-QiyāN
if we consider the ḌegaḌ justiications adduced against the contention that sociaḌizing 
with singing girls and participating in their trade is unlawful, we can indentify a clear and 
coherent narrative line in the epistle that goes from the general to the particular: in the 
irst part of the treatise, the discussion is focused on the ḌawfuḌness of the practice of seeing 
the faces of woḍen, taḌking with theḍ and enjoying their coḍpany; in the second part, the 
debate ḍoves on to the sḌaves and hovers over proxenetisḍ and sexuaḌ intercourse with 
singing-girls, often disguised as a commercial transaction.
the preaḍbḌe introduces the two ḍain inteḌḌectuaḌ interḌocutors of the treatise: the 
purported authors of the epistḌe and their adversaries, Ḍater on referred to as ḥaŀwiyya16. 
the object of the poḌeḍic is aḌso cḌearḌy stated: the authors hoḌd that enjoying the coḍpany 
of singing slaves and participating in their trade does not contravene any law and they 
15. cheikh-MouSSa 1990, p. 103.
16. al-ǦāḤiẒ, Risāla fī al-Qiyān, § 16 [hereafter qiyān, the references are to the paragraphs of Beeston’s edition. 
aḌthough i have cḌoseḌy foḌḌowed PeḌḌat and Beeston’s transḌations, the passages transḌated in this articḌe are ḍy 
own].
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have decided to write this epistle so that their silence would not be interpreted as a tacit 
admission of the arguments of their critics.
the irst arguḍentative Ḍine is essentiaḌḌy devoted to refuting the cḌaiḍs of those 
who hold that looking at women and engaging in conversation with them is unlawful. 
the defence of this practice begins with a discussion of the naturaḌ causes expḌaining the 
ḍutuaḌ need of ḍen and woḍen that incḌudes severaḌ references to Qurɻānic verses: the 
earth is for ḍan Ǧa chatteḌ and ‘a usufruct for a tiḍe’ǧ (Q. 2:36); Ǧthe woḍan ‘was created so 
that [the ḍan] couḌd ind soḌace in her’ǧ (Q. 7:189, 30:21)17; and Ǧwoḍen are tiḌḌage ground 
for ḍenǧ (Q. 2:223)18. the aḌḌeged authors of the risāla argue that men could have freely used 
women, as these verses imply, were it not that god had imposed over them the obligation 
(farḍ) of prohibiting that which is iḌḌicit and aḌḌowing that which is Ḍicit (taͥrīm mā ͥarrama 
wa-taͥlīl mā aͥalla Allāh) so that there would not be doubts concerning paternity and the 
assignation of inheritances19. the object of the discussion conveyed in the irst part of 
the epistḌe [§§7-27] is, preciseḌy, to deterḍine what shouḌd and shouḌd not be prohibited 
concerning the relationship of men and women.
the preḍise adduced to discuss this point ḍay be read in terḍs of ḌegaḌ theory:
Ǧeverything that we do not ind that the Book of god aḌḍighty and the sunna of the 
messenger of god -peace be upon hiḍ- have rendered unḌawfuḌ (maͥram) is legally 
indiferent (mubāͥ) and unquaḌiied (muṭlaq); peopḌe deeḍing soḍething good (istiͥsān) or 
bad (istiqbāͥ) do not provide any basis for ḌegaḌ reasoning (qiyās) as long as we do not infer 
froḍ the proscriptions (taͥrīm) [in the Qurɻān and the sunna] a sign (dalīl) about something 
being good (ͥusni-hi) and an indication of its ḌawfuḌness (ͥalāli-hi). We do not know any 
rationaḌe (waǄh) for jeaḌousy concerning other’s [gaining access to woḍen] than those who 
are prohibited (ͥarām); were it not because of the existence of the prohibition [regarding 
the maͥārim], jeaḌousy wouḌd have disappeared and it wouḌd have been incuḍbent upon 
us [to appḌy] ḌegaḌ reasoning (qiyās) about who is ḍore entitḌed to a woḍan, [otherwise] 
soḍeone wouḌd say: ‘no one is ḍore adequate for theḍ than another, as they are Ḍike 
nosegays or appḌes that peopḌe exchange at one another’. that is why the ḍan who wouḌd 
have had many women contents himself with one and shares the rest among his associates: 
when the ḌegaḌ obḌigation (farīḍa) of diferentiating between the ḌawfuḌ and the unḌawfuḌ 
(al-ͥalāl wa-l-ͥarām) was estabḌished, then the musḌiḍs contented theḍseḌves with the 
limit established for them and gave the man permission to do that which they authorise 
for hiḍ.ǧ20
this passage is extreḍeḌy coḍpḌicated and presents serious textuaḌ probḌeḍs. i interpret 
this argumentation as follows: all prohibitions should derive from the revealed sources, 
Qurɻān and sunna; if the revelation is silent concerning a particular issue this should be 
considered perḍitted, unḌess it is indiferent and unquaḌiied. in order to ethicaḌḌy evaḌuate 
acts not directḌy addressed by the Qurɻān and the suna, and consider something good or 
bad, the reasoning shouḌd be based on the signs (dalāɻil) provided by the legal prohibitions 
expḌicitḌy considered in the reveaḌed sources, but it is not Ḍegitiḍate to infer ḌegaḌ ruḌes 
forḍ the opinion of the peopḌe about what shouḌd be considered good or bad (istiͥsān).
17. Qiyān, § 7. i have foḌḌowed Beeston’s transḌation.
18. Qiyān, § 7.
19. Qiyān, § 8. 
20. Qiyān, § 9 [147;12f].
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it is worth noting that the emphasis falls on the limits of the prohibition rather than on 
the possibiḌities of extending it to other cases by appḌying ḌegaḌ reasoning. in this regard, 
the condemnation of istiͥsān foḌḌows an extreḍeḌy reductionist approach to the sources 
of law and is intended to limit the scope of the laws that forbid relations with women 
excḌusiveḌy to the maͥārim, as we can see in the severaḌ exaḍpḌes provided to iḌḌustrate this 
point in the ǃāhiḌiyya as weḌḌ as in isḌaḍ.
the faḍous coupḌes of pre-isḌaḍic ɼuḏrī lovers are mentioned to demonstrate that 
Ḍooking at woḍen and taḌking with theḍ (al-naϓar wa-l-muͥādaṯa) was permitted in the 
ǃāhiliyya21, and that muḥaḍḍad forbade this practice excḌusiveḌy (ḫaΣΣatan) when it involved 
ḍarried woḍen, who shouḌd wear veiḌ. With this particuḌar exception, the Prophet did not 
abrogate this practice and it was not declared ͥarām in islam22. the custoḍ of perforḍing 
the circuḍaḍbuḌation unveiḌed is aḌso adduced as an exaḍpḌe, together with the story of 
͌ubāɼa bint ɼĀḍir, who perforḍed the ṭawāf naked, and brought about this tradition. other 
exaḍpḌes are taken froḍ episodes of the history of isḌaḍ, such as the caḌiph ɼuḍar, who, 
despite being known for his jeaḌousy and his piety, aḌḌowed ɼaḌī to see his wife unveiḌed and 
did not prohibit this.23
according to the alleged authors of the risāla, there is nothing against this practice in 
the reḌigious sources except the speciic Ḍaws concerning the wives. respectabḌe igures 
of isḌaḍ with great expertise in Ḍaw such as ɼuḍar, ɼaḌī, or aḌ-Ŀaɼbī, wouḌd have prohibited 
this practice if they had known any prophetic tradition condemning this. analogy is also 
adduced to support this claim: if looking at middle-aged women is not prohibited, it should 
not be considered prohibited when the women are young24. as in the aforementioned 
paragraph rejecting istiͥsān, the reasoning is extreḍeḌy restrictive: in absence of any 
expḌicit prohibition, this issue is ḌegaḌḌy indiferent and onḌy narrow-ḍinded peopḌe 
overstep the Ḍiḍits of jeaḌousy (ͥadd al-ġayra) — which shouḌd be Ḍiḍited to one’s wives —, 
and consider the prohibition of Ḍooking at woḍen as an obḌigation and duty (ka-l-ͥāqq 
al-wāǄib)25. taking jeaḌousy beyond the Ḍiḍits of that which god has decḌared ͥarām is not 
onḌy futiḌe (bāṭil), but proper to frail minds like those of women.26
the defence of the singing-girls
at this point, the argumentation abandons the general discourse on women and 
focuses particularly on the slave-girls27. the irst point treated is the possession of sḌave 
girḌs and their appearance in pubḌic. caḌiphs and nobḌe ḍen provide a good exaḍpḌe of the 
ḌawfuḌness of owning sḌave-girḌs and enjoying their coḍpany in the presence of other ḍen: 
muɼāwiya used to have sḌave-girḌs and show theḍ in pubḌic28, and caliphs and important 
21. Qiyān, § 10-11.
22. Qiyān, § 11.
23. Qiyān, § 14. as cheikh-moussa has noted, the story is rather diferent in other sources, where ɼuḍar asks his 
wife to wear a veil, see cheikh-MouSSa 1990, p. 110.
24. Qiyān, § 25.
25. Qiyān, § 25.
26. Qiyān, § 27.
27. the change occurs in Qiyān, §28.
28. Qiyān, § 19.
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people used to employ slave-girls as personal servants who accompanied them in their 
public appearances29, without anybody raising any objection.30
having proved that owning sḌave-girḌs is Ḍicit, the discussion ḍoves on to a particuḌar 
group of them, the qiyān, and their speciic skiḌḌs. the irst to be discussed is singing. there 
is nothing reproachfuḌ in singing, as it is based on poetry and ḍusic. Poetry is not good 
or bad per se, as ɼuḍar b. aḌ-ͪaέέāb said: poetry is a kind of speech that shouḌd be judged 
according to its content, and the addition of melody does not contravene any prohibition.31 
a prophetic ͥadīṯ stating that Ǧsoḍe poetry is true wisdoḍǧ (inna min al-ŀiɼr ͥikma) is also 
quoted to defend the ḌawfuḌness of poetry. as in the discussion concerning jeaḌousy, the 
concḌusion is that there is no ḌegaḌ basis in the Qurɻān and the sunna to consider singing or 
singers unlawful.
severaḌ exaḍpḌes of faḍous igures of isḌaḍ who enjoyed ḍusic are ḍentioned in 
support of its Ḍicitness. the Ḍist is striking, to say the Ḍeast: the irst exaḍpḌe is certainḌy 
a pious musḌiḍ, ɼabd aḌḌāh b. ǃaɼfar aḌ-άayyār, who is said to have owned sḌave girḌs who 
sang and also a singing boy32; the pious ɼuḍar b. ɼabd aḌ-ɼazīz is aḌso ḍentioned, as he used 
to be a singer before coḍing to the caḌiphaḌ throne; the reḍaining exaḍpḌes, however, are 
uḍayyad caḌiphs who did not enter into history as ḍodeḌs of virtue: Yazīd b. muɼāwiya, 
who used to Ḍisten to ḍusic; Yazīd b. ɼabd aḌ-maḌik, owner of a faḍous and virtuous qayna 
naḍed saḌḌāḍa; and WaḌīd b. Yazīd, who was known by his Ḍove poetry. cheikh-moussa has 
noted the paradox of using these exaḍpḌes to defend the ḌawfuḌness of singing, when these 
caḌiphs are presented in the historicaḌ chronicḌes as epigones of the ḍoraḌ Ḍaxity and the 
dissoḌute Ḍife of the uḍayyads.33
for cheikh-moussa these passages are an ironic reference to the fauḌty arguḍentation 
of those who defend the lawfulness of singing: the doubtful moral authority of the 
igures used to support their cḌaiḍ wouḌd be incoḍpatibḌe with the rightfuḌ position they 
intend to defend, and the reference to the oḍinous uḍayyad caḌiphs wouḌd achieve the 
contrary efect and underḍine their arguḍents. however, the uḍayyad caḌiphs were not 
universaḌḌy regarded as iḍpious in tiḍe of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ; in fact, they enjoyed great acceptance 
among certain groups of the urban milieu associated to the ahl al-ͥadīṯ, to the extent that 
soḍe of theḍ excḌuded ɼaḌī froḍ the a’immat al-hudā and incḌuded muɼāwiya and his son 
Yazīd aḍong theḍ.34 ibn Qutayba ḍentions theḍ when criticizing the extreḍisḍ of soḍe 
muͥaddiṯūn who, in their zeaḌ to refute the muɼtaziḌite theses on the createdness of the 
Qurɻān, went as far as to adopt anthropoḍorphist ideas (taŀbīh). the Risāla fī al-nābita of 
aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ is another exaḍpḌe of this association of the traditionist ḍiḌieu both with the 
uḍayyads and anthropoḍorphisḍ. it wouḌd be possibḌe, then, to see in these references 
to the uḍayyads a way of pointing out not onḌy the contradictions of the defenders of the 
singing-girḌs, but rather those who heḌd theḍ as roḌe-ḍodeḌ, the ḥaŀwiyya, who certainḌy 
were reḌated to the pro-uḍayyad traditionists and had been the target of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s darts 
29. Qiyān, § 20-23.
30. Qiyān, § 23.
31. Qiyān, § 31.
32. Qiyān, § 28.
33. cheikh-MouSSa 1990, p. 108-110.
34. ibn Qutayba, al-iḫtilāf fī al-lafϓ, p. 35-36. 
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in nuḍerous occasions, aḍong other things because of their extreḍe reḌigious scrupuḌosity 
(warɼa)35. it is pertinent to take this possibility into consideration, not only because warɼa 
was behind the movements that, invoking the doctrine of al-amr bi-l-maɼrūf, condemned 
music36; but especially because it was based on similar legal principles to those adduced 
in defence of the qiyān: whereas for the authors of the risāla everything not expḌicitḌy 
forbidden in the Qurɻān and the sunna is ḌegaḌḌy indiferent and, therefore, Ḍicit; for the 
ͤaŀwiyya, anything not expressḌy sanctioned by the reḌigious sources is suspicious of being 
ͥarām and, consequentḌy, shouḌd be avoided.37
the defence of singing reported in this risāla could very well be an allusion to these 
poḌeḍics, and the striking ḍention of the uḍayyad caḌiphs be expḌained with this 
interpretation. however, the defence of the singing girḌs goes further and the Ḍine between 
ͥarām and ͥ alāl becomes more blurred: it is no longer the practice of looking at free women 
and taḌking with theḍ, or the pḌeasure of enjoying their coḍpany and their ḍusic, which 
needs to be justiied: the next step in this particuḌar tour de force is the description of the arts 
of coquetry in which the singing girḌs exceḌḌed and the discussion of the sexuaḌ reḌations to 
which this often led.
the irst expḌicit reference to sexuaḌ reḌations with the sḌaves seeḍs to pose another 
conundruḍ: it is an anecdote about aḌ-ma’ḍūn that does not present hiḍ in a very positive 
Ḍight. according to the authors, aḌ-ma’ḍūn was infatuated with one of his wife’s sḌaves, 
whom his wife set free so that the caliph could marry her, giving her a dowry of ten 
thousand dirhaḍs. right after the consuḍḍation of the ḍarriage, aḌ-ma’ḍūn Ḍet her go 
and paid her the money.38 if anything, this exaḍpḌe seeḍs to justify teḍporary ḍarriage. 
similar strategies are ascribed to the slaves who beguile their clients into marrying then to 
caḌḍ a passion that expires the very ḍoḍent it is consuḍḍated39, and the muqayyinūn to 
whoḍ aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ gives voice at the end of the epistḌe openḌy adḍit that mutɼa was the hidden 
intention behind the visits of many of their clients.40
cheikh-moussa argues that the association of aḌ-ma’ḍūn with the owners of sḌave-girḌs 
and the authors that sign the epistle cannot be understood but as a satire, as it would have 
been highḌy iḍprobabḌe that aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ wouḌd have assiḍiḌated the practices of the adḍired 
ɼabbāsid caḌiph to those of the Ḍovers of singing-girḌs. We cannot excḌude the possibiḌity 
that this reference, Ḍike those of the uḍayyads, ḍay have conveyed an ironic ḍeaning. 
however, the reference to aḌ-ma’ḍūn can aḌso be considered pertinent and ḌogicaḌ for 
two main reasons: on the one hand, the presumed authors of the letter were attached to 
court igures who represented the cuḌturaḌ and ḌegaḌ heritage of aḌ-ma’ḍūn; on the other 
hand, severaḌ sources incḌude, aḍong the poḌeḍicaḌ ḍeasures adopted by aḌ-ma’ḍūn, the 
acceptance of teḍporary ḍarriage (mutɼa).41
35. on aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s critique of reḌigious scrupuḌosity, see cooPerSon 2009.
36. cook 2000, p. 90-91.
37. see cook 2000, especiaḌḌy the section on the ḥanbaḌites of Baghdad, p. 87-105.
38. Qiyān, § 24.
39. Qiyān, § 50.
40. Qiyān, § 59.
41. al-khaṭīb al-baġdādī, ta’rīkh Baghdād, XiV, p. 201; al-Subkī, tabaqāt al-shāiɼiyya al-Kubrā, ii, p. 57. according to 
these sources, aḌ-ma’ḍūn inaḌḌy recognised that mutɼa shouḌd be prohibited after the ḥanafī Yaḥyā b. akṯaḍ proved 
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aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ hiḍseḌf deaḌt with this issue in one of his works. the extant fragḍents of the 
Kitāb al-ɼabbāsiyya discuss the unḌawfuḌness of two poḌeḍicaḌ ḍeasures taken by the irst 
two caḌiphs: abū Bakr’s rejection of fāέiḍa’s cḌaiḍs over the inheritance of muḥaḍḍad, 
concreteḌy the estates of fadak and ͪaybar; and ɼuḍar’s prohibition of the two ḍodaḌities 
of temporary marriage, the tamattuɼ on the pilgrimage and the mutɼat al-nisā’.42 aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s 
treatise reḌates the opinions of those who refuted the decisions of abū Bakr and ɼuḍar on 
the basis of the principḌes governing the abrogation of Qurɻānic verses, wrongḌy appḌied 
by both caliphs; for them, the revocation of these decisions was correct. although no 
ḍention is ḍade of aḌ-ma’ḍūn in the few passages that have survived froḍ this treatise, 
we know that aḌ-ma’ḍūn revoked both ḍeasures and the ḍost pḌausibḌe interpretation of 
these fragments is that they may have been part of a polemic concerning the controversial 
religious policies of this caliph.43
the prosopographicaḌ study carried out by naǄḍ and cheikh-moussa aḌḌows us to 
situate the alleged authors of the Risāla i al-qiyān in the human cartography of the early 
ɼabbāsid period44. aḌḌ the igures ḍentioned in the introduction beḌonged to the circḌes of 
the ɼabbāsid court, and aḌḍost aḌḌ of theḍ seeḍ to have been reḌated to one of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s 
patrons, muḥaḍḍad b. ɼabd aḌ-maḌik ibn aḌ-zayyāt. ibn aḌ-zayyāt was vizier for aḌ-muɼtaṣiḍ 
and aḌ-Wāṯiq during the Miͥna period, between 221/833 and 233/847, until he fell into 
disgrace with aḌ-mutawakkiḌ, who ordered his iḍprisonḍent, torture and execution.
the opposition between the ḍeḍbers of the court and the urban ‘ulamā’ during this 
period has been thoroughḌy studied. aḌ-ma’ḍūn’s reḌigious poḌicies and their continuation 
untiḌ the caḌiphate of aḌ-mutawakkiḌ have been interpreted either as an atteḍpt to restore 
for the caliphate the religious authority once associated to the person of the caliph, in 
opposition to the cḌaiḍs of the increasingḌy inluentiaḌ urban reḌigious schoḌars;45 or as an 
authoritarian hiatus in the traditional cooperation of caliphs and scholars.46 in any case, 
the clash between the courtly elites, among whom the authors of the Risāla fī al-qiyān should 
be included, and sectors of the urban milieu that became the seed-bed of the addressees 
of the epistḌe, the ḥaŀwiyya, provide a pḌausibḌe context to interpret this text and couḌd 
expḌain the use of aḌ-ma’ḍūn as an inteḌḌectuaḌ reference for this particuḌar interpretation 
of the law.
does it ḍean that the defence of sexuaḌ intercourse with singing girḌs is reḌated to aḌ-
ma ɻḍūn’s revocation of the prohibition of mutɼa? even if the arranged marriage of the slave 
of aḌ-ma ɻḍūn’s wife couḌd be interpreted as a diferent ḍodaḌity of union, the anecdote 
about aḌ-ma ɻḍūn’s epheḍeraḌ ḍarriage is not innocent at aḌḌ and the audience of this 
risāla wouḌd have perceived a cḌear aḌḌusion to the caḌiph’s position with regard to mutɼa; 
furtherḍore, the inaḌ speech of the muqayyinūn expḌicitḌy refers to teḍporary ḍarriage 
the soundness of a prophetic ͥadīṯ  forbidding it. ibn taghrī birdī, al-NuǄūm al-ϒāhira, ii, p. 292; and ibn khāllikān, 
Wafayāt al-aɺyān, V, 200.
42. al-ǦāḤiẒ, Kitāb al-ɼabbāsiyya.
43. for a recent anaḌysis of aḌ-ma ɻḍūn’s vindication of his reḌigious authority vis-à-vis abū Bakr and ɼuḍar which 
aḌso refers to aḌ-ma ɻḍūn’s ḍessianic beḌiefs, see yüceSoy 2009, p. 130 f.
44. cheikh-MouSSa 1990, p. 88-95.
45. laPiduS 1975; crone and hindS 1986.
46. zaMan 1997.
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as a non-recognised but obvious ḍethod of having sexuaḌ reḌations with the qiyān.47 i do 
not think, however, that the entire debate could be reduced to this simplistic dichotomy 
opposing the antagonistic discourses of the court elites and the urban ɼulamā’.
the QiyāN and the limits of legal interPretation
the poḌeḍic that the Risāla fī al-qiyān addresses is more sophisticated than that and 
echoes ḌegaḌ discussions that, aḌready in tiḍe of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ, occupied the ḍinds of iḍportant 
jurists. it is true that the epistḌe has an overaḌḌ satiricaḌ tone, but satire is onḌy possibḌe 
because the interlocutors base their arguments on a shared paradigm, which is applied to 
discuss the lawfulness of all the practices considered in this epistle: looking at women and 
talking with them, owning slaves and displaying them in presence of other men, admiring 
the ḍusicaḌ arts of the singing-girḌs and, eventuaḌḌy, enjoying their aḍatory skiḌḌs. 
the arguḍents conveyed by aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ are part of a schoḌarḌy poḌeḍic, an internaḌ debate 
aḍong jurists for which, despite the scarcity of ḌegaḌ sources froḍ the ninth century, it is 
possibḌe to ind soḍe evidence. the ḍain topic of this risāla, at least in terms of iqh, is the 
deinition of the Ḍiḍits of ḌegaḌ prohibition. as we have seen, it was forḍuḌated in a very 
restrictive way, Ḍiḍiting the scope of ḌegaḌ reasoning (qiyās) and condemning istiͥsān. these 
references are by no means a mere rhetorical trick, they point to a seriously debated issue 
aḌready addressed in a work with which aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ was faḍiḌiar. in aḌ-Ŀāiɼī’s Risāla, in the 
midst of a discussion concerning the interpretation of law made by those who give priority 
to reason over reveḌation (ahl al-ɼuqūl), the concepts of istiͥsān and qiyās are discussed in 
very similar terms:
Ǧdo you perḍit soḍeone to say: ‘i eḍpḌoy istiͥsān, without using qiyās [astaͥsinu bi-
ghayr qiyās]?’
shāiɼī: in ḍy view; that is not perḍissibḌe -though god knows best- for anyone. it 
is only for the ahl al-ɼilm to express [ḌegaḌ] opinions, and not for others [innamā kān li-ahl 
al-ɼilm an yaqūlū dūn ghayrihim], so that they express [ḌegaḌ] opinions that are reḌated to 
a reveaḌed text, by adhering to it, in situations for which there is no [directḌy opposite] 
reveaḌed text, by anaḌogizing froḍ the reveaḌed text [li-an yaqūlū fī al-khabar bi-ɻttibāɼihi fīmā 
laysa fīhī al-khabar] biɻl-qiyās ɼalā al-khabar].
if it were permissible to invalidate qiyās, then it would be permissible for the ahl al-
ɼuqūl, who are other than the ahl al-ɼilm, to express opinions concerning ḍatters for which 
there is no reveaḌed text [khabar], according to whatever ḍere preferences [istiͥsān] they 
happen to have at handǧ48.
the interḌocutors of aḌ-Ŀāiɼī in this passage, the denoḍinated ahl al-ɼuqūl, can hardly 
be reḌated to the ḥaŀwiyya fustigated in the Risāla fī al-Qiyān. But it would be an error also 
to consider that muɼtaziḌites such as aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ wouḌd faḌḌ into this category without further 
consideration. the principḌe enunciated by aḌ-Ŀāiɼī in this passage Ḍiḍits the possibiḌities 
of expressing ḌegaḌ opinions to the reveaḌed texts, exactḌy in the saḍe terḍs as the 
enunciation made by the defenders of singing-girls in his epistle.
47. Qiyān, § 59.
48. al-Šāfiʿī, Risāla § 1456-1458. i aḍ quoting the transḌation of lowry 2007, p. 290; the terms between brackets are 
his.
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aḌ-Ŀāi‘ī aḌso refutes istiͥsān in another work entitled ibṭāl al-istiͥsān. in this treatise 
he deveḌops an unusuaḌ treatḍent of ḌegaḌ ignorance based on an extreḍeḌy ḌiteraḌist 
interpretation of the sources of law.49 When deaḌing with the obḌigations of the judge, the 
Ḍiḍits of ḌegaḌ interpretation are deined in siḍiḌar terḍs:
Ǧ[there is] the Book, then the sunna, or that upon which the jurists (ahl al-ɼilm) do 
not disagree, or ḌegaḌ reasoning based on any of these [sources] (qiyās ɼalá baɼḍ). it is not 
perḍitted for anyone to judge or pronounce a fatwá on the basis of istiͥsān when istiͥsān 
is not obḌigatory (wājib) and not in any of these cases (maɼānī) [i.e. Qurɻān, sunna, ijmāɼ, and 
qiyās].
if someone asks: What is the proof that it is not permitted to apply istiͥsān when it 
is not incḌuded in any of these cases, as you have ḍentioned in this book of yours? You 
shouḌd repḌy: god aḌḍighty said ‘does ḍan think that he is to be Ḍeft directionḌess?’ (Q. 
75:36). the ahl al-ɼilm do not disagree upon the Qurɻān concerning that which you aḌready 
know, that ‘Ḍack of direction’ (sudá) is that which is neither coḍḍanded nor forbidden (lā 
yuɻmar wa-lā yunhá), and he who pronounces a fatwá or judges on the basis of that which 
has not been coḍḍanded has aḌḌowed hiḍseḌf [to do it] within the deinition of ‘the Ḍack 
of direction’ (sudá), and god has ḍade hiḍ know that he is not to be Ḍeft directionḌessǧ.50
this descriptions answer to aḌ-Ŀāiɼī’s weḌḌ known deinition of bayān: the religious 
sources and the consensus of the ahl al-ɼilm provide enough guidance to apply legal 
reasoning in those cases not speciicaḌḌy addressed by the reveḌation. god does not Ḍeave 
peopḌe directionḌess, as he aḌways provides dalāɻil that may be interpreted, but istiͥsān is 
not a vaḌid herḍeneuticaḌ technique. the ḍost signiicant aspect of this treatise is preciseḌy 
the treatḍent of the Ḍiḍitations of ḌegaḌ reasoning, which are discussed by aḌ-Ŀāiɼī as a 
consequence of the ignorance of Ḍaw:
Ǧit is incuḍbent upon the judges onḌy to accept but the justice concerning that which 
is evident (ɼadlan fī al-ϓāhir); the characteristics of justice aḍong theḍ are known and 
i have described theḍ in another pḌace. there ḍay be justice in that which is evident 
(fī al-ϓāhir) and that which it conceaḌs (fī sarīri-hi) be not just, but god has not iḍposed a 
ḍoraḌ obḌigation [upon his subjects] (lam yukallif-hum) concerning those things for whose 
knowḌedge he has not provided a ḍeans of attaining (sabīl ilá ɼilmi-hi), and he has only 
iḍposed on theḍ, whenever possibḌe, but to reject those who openḌy act (man ϓahara min-
hu) against that which they consider justiceǧ.51
in his Risāla, a similar statement is made concerning the evaluation of witnesses:
ǦWe are ḌegaḌḌy responsibḌe for accepting the itness of a ḍan [who testiies] on the 
basis of how he appears to us [mā ϓahara lanā minhu]. We ḍarry hiḍ of or ḍake hiḍ an heir 
according to how his reḌigion Ḍooks on the surface [mā yaϓhar lanā min islāmihi]ǧ.52
49. on this treatise see loWrY, Ǧignorance of the law is soḍetiḍes an excuse:  aḌ-shāiɼī’s ibṭāl al-istiͥsān and the 
construction of Juristic authorityǧ, unpubḌished paper presented in the 5th Meeting of the school of Abbasid studies.
50. al-Šāfiʿī, ibṭāl al-istiͥsān, p. 68.
51. al-Šāfiʿī, ibṭāl al-istiͥsān, p. 72.
52. al-Šāfiʿī, Risāla, § 1350; i have quoted lowry’s transḌation cf. lowry 2007, p. 148.
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however, the exaḍpḌes that iḌḌustrate the theoreticaḌ forḍuḌations of the ibṭāl al-istiͥsān 
seem to be based in an almost literal interpretation of the sources, and the prohibitions 
they discuss Ḍiḍited to that with is expḌicitḌy forbidden in the reveaḌed texts.53
as we have seen, the refutation of istiͥsān in the Risāla fī al-qiyān is very similar to 
that of aḌ-Ŀāiɼī, but the concoḍitances between both works do not stop here; the way 
aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ addresses the probḌeḍ of evaḌuating evident acts (ϓāhir al-umūr) is analogous to 
aḌ-Ŀāiɼī’s treatḍent and eḍpḌoys a very siḍiḌar forḍuḌation. the muqayyinūn report that 
soḍe peopḌe condeḍn the houses of singing-girḌs adducing that those who frequent these 
places do not do so with the purpose of listening to their music or purchasing them, but 
with the intention of having sexuaḌ intercourse with the sḌaves. the answer given to this 
accusation is based, preciseḌy, on the Ḍiḍitation of the ḌegaḌ judgeḍents to those acts that 
are public and evident:
ǦJudgeḍents are onḌy appḌied to the evident acts (ϓāhir al-umūr) and god has not 
iḍposed upon his subjects the ḍoraḌ obḌigation (lam yukallif) of judging according to the 
hidden (bāṭin), nor of taking action concerning their intentions (al-ɼamal ɼalā al-niyyāt). 
thus, a ḍan is considered musḌiḍ (yuqḍā li-l-raǄul bi-islām) on the basis of how he appears 
(bi-mā yaϓhuru minhu). he ḍay inwardḌy be a heretic, or considered the Ḍegitiḍate son of 
his father when, perhaps, the father whose paternity he claims did nor sire him; however, 
since he was born in his bed and it is known, his origin is traced back to him. if it were 
a duty (kullifa) upon the one who testiies for a ḍan in any of these two cases to teḌḌ the 
truth, there couḌd not be testiḍony on this ḍatter. those who attend our asseḍbḌies do 
not evidence anything of that which is attributed to them, and if they did it and we turned 
a bḌind eye to it, then we wouḌd not incur any sinǧ.54
the textuaḌ coḍpḌexity of this epistḌe and the Ḍack of inforḍation about the 
circuḍstances of its coḍposition do not aḌḌow us but to specuḌate about the signiicance of 
these references. aḌthough the textuaḌ evidence is not concḌusive, the paraḌḌeḌisḍ between 
these passages and aḌ-Ŀāiɼī’s considerations seeḍs cḌear and, due to aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s faḍiḌiarity 
with aḌ-Ŀāiɼī’s Risāla, we would not be on the wrong path if we were to consider that he was 
ḍaking expḌicit reference to his thesis on istiͥsān. nevertheless, the intention behind the 
particular use of this legal argumentation in the Risāla fī al-qiyān is quite diferent. in fact, 
aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ and aḌ-Ŀāiɼī part ways the very ḍoḍent these theoreticaḌ disquisitions are put 
into practice: aḌ-Ŀāiɼī is interested in the practicaḌ consequences of the ignorance of Ḍaw; 
but the consequences that aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ discusses in his epistḌe are those which resuḌt froḍ the 
ignorance of the acts theḍseḌves and the fact that no judgeḍent can be based on intention.
it wouḌd be possibḌe, as cheikh-moussa argues, that the use of soḌid ḌegaḌ arguḍents 
to build the defence of the singing-girls, and the engagement in real polemics debated 
at the ɼabbāsid court in the tiḍe of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ were a narrative device used to eḍphasise 
the absurdity of this position. however, the fundaḍents of the reasoning are coḍpḌeteḌy 
coherent with the overaḌḌ arguḍentative Ḍine, and, as i wiḌḌ try to argue, the justiication of 
53. Joseph lowry has suggested that this couḌd be a concession to the thesis of the ẓāhirīs, who, of course, aḌso 
refuted istiͥsān. We know that the son of the founder of the schooḌ, muḥaḍḍad ibn abī da ɻūd incḌuded a refutation 
of istiͥsān in his ḍanuaḌ of jurisprudence, soḍe of whose fragḍents have survived in quotations transḍitted by aḌ-
Qā͍ī aḌ-nuɼḍān, (see Stewart  2002).
54. Qiyān, §37.
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sexuaḌ intercourse with sḌaves was by no ḍeans absurd in this context. if these arguḍents 
can be considered satirical is precisely because they can be read literally.
the sPirit of the laW vs. the letter of the laW
the eḍphasis on the Ḍiḍits of the practices rendered ͥarām, the restrictive — aḌḍost 
ḌiteraḌist — treatḍent of the reveaḌed sources, and the refutation of istiͥsān point to a 
debate focused on theoreticaḌ ḌegaḌ probḌeḍs. however, the insistence on judging uniqueḌy 
the evident indicia (ϓāhir al-umūr), the reference to the testimony of the witness and the 
formulation of many of the anecdotes seem to point in the opposite direction, to the realm 
of praxis. this apparent contradiction is soḌved in the Ḍast stage of the risāla, when we hear 
the allegations of the owners of the slave girls whose names, real or not, are given by al-
ǃāḥiẓ.
the muqayyinūn do not only defend the nobility of their occupation, but also its licitness. 
the basis for this point is that the aḌḌeged sexuaḌ reḌations with the sḌaves, when they exist, 
can onḌy be interpreted as the Ḍicit consequence of a perfectḌy ḌegaḌ contractuaḌ procedure. 
concreteḌy, they cḌaiḍ that those who can diferentiate between perḍitted and prohibited 
(farq mā bayna al-ͥalāl wa-l-ͥarām) wouḌd not ind anything iḌḌegaḌ in proxenetisḍ (kaŀḫ).55 
selling a slave and buying her again for a lower price, once the passion of her buyer has 
dissipated and he wants to send her back to her former owner, is perfectly licit; and if the 
intention of the cḌients who visit their girḌs is to arrange a teḍporary ḍarriage (yakūnu 
qaΣduhu li-l-mutɼa), they ask, what discredited should be attached to them?56 indeed, they 
are appḌying the principḌes exposed at the beginning of the epistḌe: enjoying the coḍpany 
and musical skills has not been rendered ͥarām by god, therefore it is completely lawful; 
as for their trade, their transactions are perfectly legal, as the aͥkām can only be based on 
evidences, not on the hidden intentions of their clients.
this Ḍast airḍation, sustained on the repeated arguḍents concerning the Ḍiḍits of 
legal interpretation, is the perfect corollary to this fascinating tour de force in defence of 
the singing girls, and discloses the underlying logic of the epistle: it is the letter of the law 
which counts, not its spirit. it also points to the legal polemic to which this treatise of al-
ǃāḥiẓ uḌtiḍateḌy answers: the debate concerning the maḫāriǄ fī al-iqh or ͥiyal fī al-iqh, the 
ḌegaḌ tricks or devices used to achieve an objective, soḍetiḍes iḌḌegaḌ, through apparentḌy 
legal means. it is within the broad framework of reference of iqh and the particuḌar context 
of the polemics concerning ͥiyal where the Risāla fī al-qiyān reveaḌs aḌḌ its rich coḍpḌexity.
several treatises that bear testimony to the vividness of the discussion of ͥiyal in 
the earḌy ɼabbasid period have survived. it was Joseph schacht who ḍade the greatest 
contribution to the study of this subject with the edition of four treatises on ͥiyal, three 
ḥanafī and one Ŀāiɼī. two of the ḥanafī treatises were written in the third/ninth century: 
the Kitāb al-maḫāriǄ fī al-ͥiyal by muḥaḍḍad b. aḌ-ḥasan aḌ-Ŀaybānī (d. 189/805), and 
the Kitāb al-ͥiyal wa-l-maḫāriǄ by aḥḍad b. ɼuḍar aḌ-ͪaṣṣāf (d. 261/874); the third one 
is a coḍḍentary of aḌ-Ŀaybānī’s work by muḥaḍḍad b. aḥḍad aḌ-saraͫsī (d. 448/1056), 
55. Qiyān, § 59.
56. Qiyān, § 59.
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included in his Kitāb al-mabsūṭ. the fourth one, entitḌed Kitāb al-ͥiyal fī al-iqh, was written 
by the Ŀāiɼite jurist maḥḍūd b. aḌ-ḥasan aḌ-Qazwīnī (l. 440/1048), aḌthough we know that 
at Ḍeast two other Ŀāiɼite treatises on ͥ iyal were written prior to the fourth/tenth century57. 
for schacht, the discussions on these ḌegaḌ devices aiḍed to iḌḌ the gap between ḌegaḌ 
theory and sociaḌ praxis58. the pious jurists of the irst/seventh century forḍuḌated the 
legal rules in such a rigid manner that it prevented the development of varied commercial 
activities. Like Roman commercial law, which complemented the formal and rigid ius civile, 
ͥiyal would provide a valid way to overcome these limitations.59
schacht’s thesis have been revised in the Ḍast years, notabḌy by satoe horii, who has 
criticised the sharp distinction he posited between theory and practice and emphasised 
the role that the ͥiyal pḌayed in the theoreticaḌ discussions of jurists attached to diferent 
schooḌs, not onḌy ḥanafīs. PreciseḌy, one of the arguḍents upon which horii draws attention 
to signaḌ the iḍportance of taking seriousḌy the juristic understanding of ͥiyal is that, 
according to the reḍarks ḍade by aḌ-ͪaṣṣāf in the introductory chapter of his MaḫāriǄ, 
Ǧa ḌegaḌ act ḍust be judged according to its appearance, irrespective of the reaḌ intentions 
behind itǧ.60
aḌthough aḌ-ͪaṣṣāf does not use the expressions ϓāhir or bāṭin, his deinition of ͥila is 
based in the opposition of deaḌings (muɼāmalāt) and suspicion (ŀubha, wahm):
Ǧthere is nothing wrong in the ḌegaḌ devices (ͥiyal) concerning that which is licit 
(fīmā yaͥallu) and adḍitted (yaǄūzu). the ḌegaḌ devices (ͥiyal) are something with which a 
ḍan escapes froḍ sins (al-ma’āṯim) and prohibition (al-ͥarām) and inds an exit (yaḫruǄu) 
with it towards that which is Ḍicit (ͥalāl). in this and similar things there is nothing wrong. 
the onḌy thing bḌaḍefuḌ in this is when a ḍan uses a ḌegaḌ device (yaͥtālu) against the 
rights of another ḍan in order to prove hiḍ to be wrong (yabṭuluhu), or when he uses a 
ḌegaḌ device on soḍething wrong untiḌ it becoḍes doubtfuḌ (ͥattā yuwahima) or applies 
it to soḍething to create doubts about it (ŀubha). as for that which corresponds to the 
method that we have described, there is nothing wrong, and this is a book in which there 
are things that peopḌe need regarding their deaḌings (muɼāmalātihim) and issues (umūr)ǧ.61
aḌ-ͪaṣṣāf aḌso states cḌearḌy that ḌegaḌ judgeḍent cannot be based on intentions: Ǧthe 
intention (niyya) of someone does not change any of the legal decisions stipulated by god 
(ͥukm min aͥkām Allāh), nor does it reḍove hiḍ froḍ his positionǧ.62
it is beyond doubt that the arguḍents conveyed by aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ address siḍiḌar ḌegaḌ 
probḌeḍs, but two questions reḍain open: irst, can we ind any direct reḌation between 
the singing girls and the treatises on ͥ iyal? second, were the ḍeḍbers of the ɼabbāsid court 
ḍentioned in the introduction and the ḥaŀwiyya reḌated to these particuḌar poḌeḍics?
the answer to the irst question is, to a great extent, provided by aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ hiḍseḌf. as 
we have seen, the way of acquiring a sḌave described by the muqayyinūn is a legal device 
that conceaḌs a teḍporary ḍarriage. the anecdote where uḍḍ ǃaɼfar, aḌ-ma’ḍūn’s wife, 
57. see Schacht 1926 and horii 2002.
58. Schacht 1926, p. 211.
59. Schacht 1952, p. 327.
60. horii 2002, p. 316.
61. al-Ḫaṣṣāf, Kitāb al-ḫaΣΣāf fī al-maḫāriǄ, p. 4. the Ḍast sentences concerning the wrong practices that shouḌd be 
censured are repeated ḌiteraḌḌy in aḌ-saraḥsī’s coḍḍentary of aḌ-Ŀaybānī, p. 88-89.
62. al-Ḫaṣṣāf, Kitāb al-ḫaΣΣāf fī al-maḫāriǄ, p. 7.
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manumits her slave so that his husband could marry her and divorce her once he has sated 
his passion is also one of these ͥiyal. even the anecdotes about free women reproduce 
the typical casuistry of this literature: someone wants to marry a woman whose former 
husband has divorced under certain condition (ŀarṭ), and a legal device is applied to solve 
this probḌeḍ. the episode concerning ɼuḍar b. aḌ-ͪaέέāb is one of these cases. ɼuḍar 
ḍarried ɼĀtika bint zayd b. nufayḌ after she becaḍe a widow and had received part of her 
forḍer husband’s possessions on the condition of never reḍarrying. ɼuḍar found a way to 
break this proḍise by stipuḌating that he shouḌd give her an equivaḌent suḍ of ḍoney, and 
that she should distribute it in alms.63 though apparentḌy Ḍess contrary to the spirit of the 
Ḍaw than the forḍer exaḍpḌe, the objective of this ḍeasure was none other than breaking 
a proḍise, one of the ḍain subjects of the treatises on ͥiyal.
if we pay attention to the taxonoḍy of the cases conteḍpḌated in these treatises, 
marriages with free women and slaves hold a privileged position. in the introduction of 
the coḍḍentary of aḌ-Ŀaybānī’s Kitāb al-maḫāriǄ fī al-ͥiyal ḍade by aḌ-saraͫsī, these are 
precisely the main causes adduced in order to prove the need of ͥiyal:
Ǧhe who scrutinises the ḌegaḌ judgeḍents (aͥkām al-ŀarɼ) inds that aḌḌ kind of acts 
answer to the description [of ͥīla]: if soḍeone Ḍoves (aͥabba) a woman, when he asks: 
‘what is the ḌegaḌ device (ͥīla) for ḍe to achieve her?’, the answer is: ‘ḍarry her’; if he 
is infatuated with a sḌave (hawā Ǆāriya) and asks: ‘what is the ḌegaḌ device (ͥīla) for me to 
achieve her?’, the answer is: ‘buy her’; when he does not Ḍike the coḍpany of his wife and 
asks: ‘what is the ḌegaḌ device (ͥīla) for ḍe to separate froḍ her?’, the answer is: ‘divorce 
her’, and if, after divorcing her, he regrets [his decision] and asks about the ḌegaḌ device 
(ͥīla) to soḌve this, the answer is: ‘re-ḍarry her (rāǄǄaɼahā)’; and after divorcing her three 
tiḍes, if she repents froḍ her bad conduct and they both ask about a ḌegaḌ device (ͥīla) 
for theḍ, the answer is that the ḌegaḌ device (ͥīla) consists in marrying her with another 
husband who shouḌd have sexuaḌ intercourse with her.
those who abhor the use of ͥiyal in legal decisions, in reality, abhor legal decisions 
theḍseḌves, and onḌy those who have ḌittḌe attention faḌḌ in this confusionǧ.64
if we were to evaḌuate this passage by appḌying the saḍe criterion used to read aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s 
epistḌes we shouḌd concḌude that this is a ine exaḍpḌe of irony, but it is not: the musḌiḍs 
jurists on the third/ninth century took this issue very seriousḌy. aḌ-saraḥsī’s coḍḍentary 
begins with a defence of ͥiyal from the attacks of those who, in his opinion, are ignorant 
(Ǆuhhāl), ḍiserabḌe (mukāŀafa) and incapable of doing a proper analysis of the sources of 
Ḍaw (qillat al-ta ɻammul).65 this coḍḍentary was written in the irst haḌf of the six/eḌeventh 
century, but, as we have seen in the case of aḌ-ͪaṣṣāf, the treatises that have survived froḍ 
the fourth/ninth century also adopt a defensive tone. since we cannot consider that the 
defence of ͥiyal was excḌusiveḌy ḥanafī, we cannot ascribe its critics to one speciic schooḌ 
or orientation. however, both the especiaḌ invoḌveḍent of the earḌy ḥanafī schooḌ in the 
development of ͥiyal and the anti-traditionist theoḌogicaḌ positions of abū ḥanīfa and his 
followers are well known.66 the ascendancy of iḌḌustrious schoḌars reḌated to the Baṣran or 
63. Qiyān, § 14.
64. al-SaraḤšī, Kitāb al-Mabsūṭ (reproduced in al-Šaybānī, Kitāb al-maḫāriǄ fī al-ͥiyal), p. 77.
65. al-SaraḤšī, Kitāb al-Mabsūṭ, p. 77.
66. Melchert 1997, p. 32-38.
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earḌy ḥānafī schooḌs over the caḌiphaḌ court is aḌso weḌḌ attested; we onḌy need to think of 
abū Yūsuf — represented in the Alf laylā wa-laylā as a master of ͥiyal!67 —, Yaḥyā b. akṯaḍ, 
or the patron of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ and ibn ḥanbaḌ’s archeneḍy, ibn abī duɻād.
it is aḌso possibḌe to ind evidence of a cḌearḌy beḌḌigerent position against ͥiyal in 
the traditionist ḍiḌieu where those whoḍ aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ pejorativeḌy denoḍinated ḥaŀwiyya 
beḌonged. no Ḍess a schoḌar than aḌ-Buͫārī incḌuded a chapter condeḍning ͥiyal in his 
collection of ͥadīṯ, which begins with a prophetic ͥadīṯ  stating that god rewards people 
according to their intentions (aɼmāl bi-l-niyya)68, and incḌudes an expḌicit condeḍnation of 
the ͥiyal used to arrange a teḍporary ḍarriage. aḌ-Buͫārī, on the authority of ɼaḌī, reports 
that the Prophet forbad the practice of mutɼa on the day of the BattḌe of ͪaybar: soḍe 
peopḌe consider that the ḌegaḌ devices appḌied to arrange a teḍporary ḍarriage (iͥtiyāl 
ͥattā tamattaɼa) render the ḍarriage invaḌid (al-nikāͥ fāsid), others argue that the marriage 
is vaḌid (Ǆāɻiz), but its condition is invaḌid (al-ŀart bāṭil)69. the saḍe reasoning is repeated 
in the commentary of a ͥadīṯ  condemning a legal device used to avoid paying the dowry 
denominated ŀiġār70.
the quarreḌ between the ḍeḍbers of the court presented as the aḌḌeged authors of the 
Risāla fī al-Qiyān, the muqayyinn, and their inteḌḌectuaḌ interḌocutors, the ḥaŀwiyya, echoes 
this polemic and applies the same legal arguments to the defence of the singing girls and 
the pleasures of their maǄālis. as we have shown, the legal basis for this defence is by no 
means a sophistic inversion of the ŀarīɼa, but a reasoned and coherent relection upon the 
herḍeneuticaḌ techniques that aḌḌow ḌegaḌ interpretation and its Ḍiḍits. 
conclusions
the aiḍ of this articḌe was to eḍphasise the iḍportance of ḌegaḌ disquisitions for the 
proper understanding of the Risāla fī al-qiyān. in the light of these conclusions, however, 
we need to ask an obvious question: how can we harḍonise this reading with the soḌid 
ethicaḌ considerations discussed in the epistḌe? the ḍetanarrative twist of the Ḍast 
paragraph ofering three authoriaḌ ascriptions —which PeḌḌat did not considered part of 
the work—, suggests that this risāla ḍay have been conceived as an inteḌḌectuaḌ gaḍe. the 
ḍoraḌ distance between the proper —and ethicaḌ— interpretation of Ḍaw and the ḌegaḌ —yet 
unethicaḌ— devices used to render it practicabḌe ḍay have been for aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ proportionaḌ 
to that which separated ͥubb and ɼiŀq. i would like to propose, however, an alternative 
reading: would it be possible to understand this discourse on love as a subversion of the 
moral principles on which it relies, in the same way that legal principles were manipulated 
to defend the singing-girls?
if, rather than as a critique of the singing-girḌs, we read the censure of infatuation as 
part of a discussion between the nobḌe ḍen, who want to enjoy the pḌeasures provided 
by the slave-girls, and the muqayyinūn, who are interested in prolonging this passionate 
67. Melchert 1997, p. 9.
68. al-buḪārī, ΢aͥīͥ, n. 6553.
69. al-buḪārī, ΢aͥīͥ, n. 6560.
70. al-buḪārī, ΢aͥīͥ, n. 6559.
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state, this arguḍentation acquires a diferent ḍeaning which ḍay be coḍpatibḌe with the 
discourse on law.
the dangers of the singing-girḌs denounced by aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ, who speaks in irst person in 
these passages, are based on the passion they inspire and its consequences for the physicaḌ 
and ḍentaḌ heaḌth of the infatuated cḌient. unḌike the pure sentiḍents inspired by Ḍove, 
passion disappears as soon as the object of desire is attained. if there is nothing iḌḌegaḌ in 
this practice, then the onḌy obstacḌe between those who want to enjoy the coḍpany of the 
singing-girḌs and the object of their passion is the diḌatory practices of the muqayyinūn who 
seek to increase their beneits and know that, when the Ḍover possesses the beḌoved, passion 
ends and their proits diḍinish71. froḍ this perspective, aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s discourse on Ḍove couḌd 
have aḌso been aiḍed at supporting the arguḍents of the authors of the epistḌe: enjoying 
the company of singing-girls is a licit and acceptable practice whose only danger lies in the 
greed of their owners, always eager to play with the feelings of the clients infatuated with 
their sḌaves; but if passion couḌd be easiḌy sated by attaining the object of desire through 
lawful means, then decorum and muruɻa wouḌd reḍain intact. thus, both the discourse on 
law and the discourse on love could have been used to build the arguments of the authors 
of the epistḌe: the irst is addressed to the ḥāŀwiyya, the second to the muqayyinūn.
this subversion of the ethicaḌ principḌes of Ḍaw and Ḍove can onḌy be understood as 
irony. as in other treatises of aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ, the huḍoristic efect of this text depends to a great 
extent on the ignorance of those who are incapabḌe of understanding the subtḌeties of his 
reasoning.  the narrative device that expḌains the satiricaḌ nature of this ḍasterpiece is not 
the humoristic face value of the opinions of its purported authors, but the use of solid and 
coherent arguments in defence of immoral practices. 
of course, ḍany of ḍy airḍations are entireḌy conjecturaḌ, but this interpretation 
ofers a possibḌe reading. We are not faḍiḌiar with the conventions governing this epistḌe 
and there is stiḌḌ ḍuch research needed to decipher the codes of ɺabbāsid etiquette and how 
they are reḌated to the sociaḌ Ḍogic of texts. the Risāla fī al-qiyān is a paradigḍatic exaḍpḌe 
of the probḌeḍs we researchers have to face. this text chaḌḌenges, especiaḌḌy, the generic 
divisions that afect the study of adab, but aḌso those which afect the study of isḌaḍic Ḍaw. 
in this paper i have tried to demonstrate that iqh is not onḌy another eḌeḍent in aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s 
cabinet of curiosities. his inteḌḌectuaḌ connection with igures such as aḌ-Ŀāiɺī can shed 
Ḍight on ḍany aspects of his work; converseḌy, aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ’s use of sophisticated herḍeneuticaḌ 
principḌes bears testiḍony of the extent to which ḌegaḌ theory had perḍeated ɺabbāsid 
society by the third/ninth century. in this regard, it wouḌd not be an exaggeration to airḍ 
that historians of Ḍiterature shouḌd keep in ḍind ḌegaḌ poḌeḍics when reading aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ, and 
that aḌ-ǃāḥiẓ is one of those authors that the historians of isḌaḍic Ḍaw shouḌd read.
71. Qiyān, § 57.
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